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CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
AND ADJUSTMENTS -
SUBCHAPTER C OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
The quest for certainty in taxes - except in the doleful
sense of their inevitability - is never-ending. Too often,
however, when, in the effort to achieve certainty, mechani-
cal rules are substituted for judgment, taxpayers find
themselves on the wrong side of the arbitrary lines which
must be drawn. When this happens, taxpayer preference
for the type of flexibility which permits cases to be decided
on their merits revives and the old order is thought to be
not so bad after all. This in essence is the story of the 1954
revision of the provisions dealing with corporate distribu-
tions and adjustments. In other words, the abrupt retreat
from the House version of the Bill was motivated by a
mixture of reluctance to abandon the familiar and the
realization, brought about by particularization, of the price
that must be paid for rules of thumb.
For convenience, the subject of corporations, their
shareholders, and the relations between them may be
divided into three parts, as has been done in subchapter C
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of Chapter 1 of the new Code, leaving out of account in-
solvency reorganizations and carryovers. The first deals
with corporate distributions other than in liquidation, the
second with corporate liquidations, and the third with cor-
porate organizations and reorganizations. The basic struc-
ture of the statutory scheme has long been relatively simple.
A corporation is not a mere extension of its shareholders'
personalities, but is a separate entity, taxable on its own in-
come. Shareholders are not taxable on such income until it
is distributed to them, at which time it constitutes income on
the shareholders' investment, that is, dividends, taxable at
full rates.1 If, on the other hand, the shareholders dispose
of their investment, the resulting gain, if any, even though
it may be represented in whole or in part by accumulated
earnings of the corporation, which, if distributed in or-
dinary course, would be taxed as dividends, is taxed at
capital gains rates. Such a disposition can take the form of
a sale to third parties or a sale to the corporation. For this
purpose, the receipt of a liquidating distribution is treated
as a species of sale to the corporation.
Strict adherence to the logic of the corporation as a
separate entity would produce many taxable events which
as a practical matter it may be better to ignore. Suppose
an inventor and his backers decide the best way to exploit
his invention is to organize a corporation for the purpose,
the inventor transferring his invention and his backers
paying in cash in exchange for all the corporation's stock.
Despite the fact that the stock received by the inventor
may be worth more than his investment in, though not
the value of, his patent and that he may therefore techni-
cally realize gain, Congress has long thought that this is
an inappropriate time to cast accounts for tax purposes.
Similarly, if a business already in corporate form is re-
I We are speaking here conceptually and therefore leave out of account
the dividend exclusion, the dividend received credit, and, in the case of
corporate shareholders, the dividend received deduction.
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organized, either by way of recapitalization, or through
migration of the corporate charter, or by merger or con-
solidation, the shareholder retaining a continuing- interest
in the business as such, some rule for non-recognition of
the technical gain realized in such cases must be provided
if for no other reason than the practical one of not placing
an embargo on normal and often economically desirable
business transactions. This is not to say that the motivation
for such non-recognition provisions may not also be in part
conceptual, i.e., that in some contexts a corporation is more
a matter of form than of substance, but so many neuroses
have developed concerning the use and abuse of these
provisions over the years that the point has almost been
reached where, in order to be fully understood, they must
be read in the light of what they are intended to prevent
as much as in the light of what they are intended to permit.
I
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
The simple corporate distribution is one made in cash
and without any pretense of redeeming any sto'ck. If the
corporation has earnings and profits of the taxable year,
or accumulated since March 1, 1913, in an amount at least
equal to the distribution, it is taxable to the recipient
shareholders as a dividend. To the extent that the earnings
and profits are not sufficient to cover the distribution, it is
treated as a capital recovery until it equals the taxpayer's
investment in the stock; any excess (except when it comes
out of pre-March 1, 1913, appreciation in the value of
property, which is distributable tax-free) is treated as a
gain from the sale of the stock. On these basic principles
the old law and the new are alike.
Complications arise when the distribution is not in
money, but in property. Under the old law the general rule
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was that property distributions were to be picked up by
the distributees at fair market value. Passing for the
moment the questions of dividend measurement where
earnings and profits were sufficient to cover the distributing
corporation's basis, but not the fair market value, of the
distributed property and of the effect of such a distribution
on the distributing corporation's earnings and profits ac-
count, this rule often made the intercorporate dividend
route a cheap device for stepping up the basis of appreci-
ated property. Starting with the premise that a distributing
corporation realizes no gain from the distribution of an
appreciated asset in kind and taking into account the fact
that a corporate recipient pays tax on only 15 percent of
dividends received from another domestic corporation, an
asset costing $10,000 but worth $100,000, for example,
could be distributed to another corporation as a dividend
without increasing the distributee's income by more than
$15,000 (15 percent of $100,000). But the property would
be deemed to have "cost" it $100,000, since that was its
value upon receipt; such "cost" would be available to the
distributee corporation to measure future depreciation, or
gain or loss on future disposition. There would never be a
corporate tax on the $90,000 of appreciation as such.
Such was the state of the law until the Revenue Act of
1950. Section 1222 of that Act adopted the drastic remedy
of limiting the dividends received credit of a corp~orate
shareholder upon the receipt of appreciated property as a
dividend in kind to 85 percent of the basis of such
property in the distributing corporation's hands. Thus, in
the example given, the shareholder corporation would be
taxable on $91,500 as ordinary income ($100,000, the
fair market value of the property, less a dividends re-
ceived credit of $8,500). Where the gain, if realized by the
distributing corporation itself, would have been capital
2 Revenue Act of 1950, § 122, 64 STAT. 919-20, (1950).
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gain, the solution was an unduly harsh one. By focusing
on the dividend rather than the primary corporate tax
on the appreciation itself, it was a violation of the general
scheme of corporate taxation. But drastic as it was, the
solution did not cover cases where, because of the absence
of earnings and profits, the distribution would not be a
dividend, but would simply be applied against the basis of
the stock.
Taking a new look at the problem, the draftsmen of the
1954 Code decided that the best answer was to limit the
amount of the distribution in such cases to the basis of the
property .in the hands of the distributing corporation.
Therefore, the corporate recipient would be deemed to
have received a distribution of only $10,000; if it was a
dividend, the amount subject to tax would be only $1,500;
the $10,000 basis of the property in the hands of the
distributing corporation would carry over to the distributee
corporation; and the $90,000 of appreciation would not be
taken into account until actually realized at the corporate
level in some subsequent transaction.
At least two interpretative problems can arise under this
new structure, taken together with the definition of prop-
erty in Section 317 (a) 3 and the stock dividend rules of
Section 305. Assume an intercorporate dividend in bonds
of the distributing company, issued at an interest rate
which makes them immediately salable at a premium.
Or assume a taxable stock dividend (in payment of cur-
rent preference dividends, for example) in newly issued
shares worth $100 each. Both are apparently to be treated
as property distributions, the first because Section 317 (a)
states that:
For purposes of this part,* the term "property" means
money, securities, and any other property; except that
3 Throughout the remainder of the article, references to sections by
number are to the INRsxAL REsvE CODE of 1954 unless otherwise specifi-
cally stated in the text or indicated by footnote.
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such term does not include stock in the corporation
making the distribution (or rights to acquire such
stock) ,4
and the second because, despite the exception in Section
317 (a) concerning stock of the distributing corporation,
Section 305 (b) provides that a so-called taxable stock
dividend:
. . . shall be treated as a distribution of property to
which section 301 applies-.. .. 5
How is the adjusted basis rule to be applied? Perhaps the
answer is that the rule operates only where the property
distributed has a basis (even though it may be zero) in
the hands of the distributing corporation and not where
it has no basis at all because from the distributing corpora-
tion's point of view it is not an asset, but a liability. This
is fortified by the fact that the rationale of the adjusted
basis rule has no operation in either a stock or a bond
case. There is no appreciation in the hands of the distribut-
ing corporation to be preserved for future recognition.
Thus, one part of the comparison being missing, we are
forced in all cases to resort to the other, viz., fair market
value. Of course, the necessity of resorting to this or other
makeshift arguments, such as that the basis of a bond is
face since that is the measure of the liability and is also
the amount by which earnings and profits are reduced
(see Section 312 (a) (2)), is unfortunate, and the
ambiguity ought to be corrected by legislation.'
Another apparent oversight is Section 453 (d), which
will tax the distributing corporation on the distribution of
an instalment obligation. Under the adjusted basis rule of
Section 301 (b) (1) (B) (ii) and (d) (2) (B) it is pro-
vided that both the intercorporate distribution and the
4 69A STAT. 99 (1954).
5 68A STAT. 90 (1954).
6 Section 1.301-1(d) of the Treasury's proposed regulations takes the
position outlined in this paragraph.
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carryover basis shall be increased by the amount of gain
recognized to the distributing corporation under Section
311 (b) and (c), dealing with the distribution of LIFO
inventories and assumption of liabilities, respectively. For
some reason there is a failure to specify that adjustment
should also be made for the gain recognized under Section
453 (d) on the distribution of an instalment obligation;
this failure is all the more surprising since Section 311 (a)
itself refers to Section 453 (d) as an exception to the gen-
eral rule of non-recognition of gain or loss to the distribut-
ing corporation upon a property distribution. Unless this
is corrected there is a danger of two full taxes in this situa-
tion, one to the distributing corporation on the distribution
and one to the distributee corporation when it realizes on
the obligation. With the inequity so patent and the general
principle of the statute so plain, perhaps there is a chance
the letter of the law will not be applied - a technical
excuse may be found in the subtle differences which exist
in the instalment provisions of the Code as compared with
other non-recognition provisions turning on preservation
of basis; but the reed is a slender one to lean upon in view
of the apparent applicability of the maxim inclusio unius
exclusio alterius.
Property distributions in the past have produced other
complications. Let us assume a non-corporate shareholder,
to whom the adjusted basis rule just discussed is not avail-
able and by whom, therefore, all property distributions are
reportable at fair market value. Let us further assume that
he is the sole shareholder of his corporation, which
distributes to him property having a basis in its hands of
$25,000, but a fair market value of $100,000, at a time
when its earnings and profits account stands at only
$40,000. How much is taxable as a dividend, and by how
much should the corporation's earnings and profits account
be reduced?
Turning to the old Code, we find, first, a definition of
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the term "dividend" (section 115 (a))' substantially simi-
lar to that contained in Section 316 (a) of the new Code:
, * * any distribution made by a corporation to its
shareholders, whether in money or in other property,
(1) out of its earnings or profits accumulated after
February 28, 1913, or (2) out of earnings or profits of
the taxable year. .... 8
No quantitative definition of a distribution was provided,
however. In lieu thereof, Section 115 (j) provided:
If the whole or any part of a dividend is paid . . .
in any medium other than money the property received
other than money shall be included in gross income at
its fair market value at the time as of which it becomes
income to the shareholder.9
With this statutory framework, it was at least arguable
that a dual approach to the question of quantum was pos-
sible, one for the purpose of determining the character
of the distribution, that is to say, the extent to which it
came out of earnings or profits, and the other for the pur-
pose of determining the dollar amount to be reported by
the shareholders. Translating this in terms of our example,
we would say that, from the distributing corporation's
point of view, the distribution is $25,000, that being the
figure assigned to the property in stating the corporate
accounts, including the amount of its earnings and profits.
Since this is less than the amount of the earnings and
profits account, the entire distribution is out of earnings and
profits and therefore a dividend. From this point on every-
thing is clear: Section 115 (j)10 requires the shareholders
to report $100,000.
The income tax is over 40 years old, but this answer to
a vexing problem was not reached until May of 1954, when
two Courts of Appeals came to the same conclusion
7 INT. R v. CODE of 1939 § 115 (a).
8 Ibid.
* INT. REV. CODE of 1939 § 115 (j).
10 Ibid.
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simultaneously." Prior to these decisions, it appeared that,
after many years of battling in the courts, 'the Commis-
sioner, -barring legislation, would be forced to accept a
single-standard approach to the measurement of dividend
income. That is to say, both for the purpose of determining
whether it was out of earnings and profits and for the
purpose of measuring the shareholder's includable amount,
a property distribution would be taken into account at
fair market value. In terms of our example, this would
mean a dividend of only $40,000. In other words, the
corporation would be considered to have made a distribu-
tion of $100,000, but since it had only $40,000 of earnings
and profits, only that amount is considered as out of
earnings and profits and therefore a dividend. The re-
mainder would be a return of capital - presumably the
shareholder's capital, since the unrealized appreciation did
not appear anywhere in the corporation's balance sheet,
either as capital or surplus.
During the course of this controversy over the years,
various other approaches were likewise attempted. One
was to argue that, though unrealized appreciation was not
includable in income,' it was includable in earnings and
profits for purposes of dividend measurement, thereby
producing the necessary basis for holding the distribution
to be a dividend. To revert again to our example, the cor-
poration's earnings and profits account would be increased
to $115,000 ($40,000 plus $75,000), which would be ample
to cover the $100,000 distribution. Little or no success was
had with this approach in the courts. Essentially, the Gov-
ernment preferred it to matching basis against earnings
and profits computed without reference to the apprecia-
tion in the asset distributed, since it might produce a
n1 Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. de-
nied, 75 Sup. Ct. 85 (1954); Commissioner v. Godley, 213 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 86 (1954).
12 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935).
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greater dividend in cases of no earnings and profits or
earnings and profits less than basis.
Variations of the basis technique have also been ad-
vanced. One represents the only type of situation in which
the Commissioner met with success prior to 1954. One or
two decisions 3 suggested that if the distributed property
was acquired out of earnings and profits, then any appreci-
ation in its value would likewise be in the nature of earn-
ings and profits. No one was happy with such a rule,
however - tracing was out of the question; and these
cases must be regarded as sports.
Still another variation of the basis measure involves a
backhanded approach to the out-of-earnings-and-profits
test, that is to say, reading it to mean "not out of capital."
This is an adaptation of the partial liquidation rule set forth
in old Section 115 (c) to the effect that the part of a
distribution in partial liquidation:
... which is properly chargeable to capital account
shall not be considered a distribution of earnings or
profits.1
4
In other words, the part which is not properly chargeable
to capital account shall be considered a distribution of
earnings and profits. Since only the basis of the asset is
reflected in the corporate accounts, so the argument runs,
no more than the basis can ever be attributed to capital,
even if there are no earnings and profits. Therefore, un-
realized appreciation must always be considered as out of
earnings and profits. This argument is mentioned in the
Hirshon case, though not necessarily a part of the ratio
decidendi, since the basis itself was amply covered by
earnings and profits.
Because of the relative simplicity of their factual situa-
tions (earnings and profits at least equal to basis), even
'3 Commissioner v. Wakefield, 139 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1943); Binzel v.
Commissioner, 75 F2d 989 (2d Cir. 1935).
L4 INT. REV. CODE of 1939 § 115(c).
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Hirshon and Godley left many troublesome questions un-
answered. What happens when the basis of the distributed
property is only partly covered by earnings and profits, or
not at all? Will a percentage test be applied? Or will one of
the alternate methods of bringing unrealized appreciation
into account be employed?
Curiously enough, when the draftsmen tackled this
problem in drawing up the House version of the Bill, it
was assumed that the law as to taxability of the recipients of
a property distribution had been settled by decision against
the Government's contention that unrealized appreciation
could be taxed as a dividend in the absence of regularly
computed earnings and profits sufficient to cover it and that
the only problem, except to the extent that it was de-
termined as a matter of policy to change the law, was as to
how the earnings and profits account ought to be charged
in the case of such a distribution. Should earnings and prof-
its be charged by fair market value or by basis? Prior law
was uncertain. Section 310 (a) of the House Bill-Section
312 (a) in the Code as finally enacted-properly provided
that the reduction should be by basis, whether the property
had increased or decreased in value.
The supposed general rule that dividend measurement
was to be based on a comparison of regularly computed
earnings and profits and fair market value of the distri-
buted property was left alone, however, except where the
distributed property was inventory. In inventory cases
unrealized appreciation is to be added to earnings and
profits, making it taxable to the shareholders as a dividend,
and a corresponding reduction made as a result of the
distribution. 5
Then came Hirshon and Godley, indicating that the as-
15 This rule should probably contain an exception relative to intercor-
porate distributions, where basis is a limiting factor in measuring the dis-
tribution. Unrealized appreciation ought not to be permitted to convert a
distribution measured by basis into a dividend.
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sumption that the character of the distribution was to be
determined under the old law by looking at fair market
value rather than basis was erroneous. This confronted
the policy-makers with a difficult problem: What should
be done with the Government's hard-won victory? Should
it be gratefully accepted, with or without some further
spelling-out in the statute to clarify the ambiguous situa-
tions which have already been mentioned? Or should
the Bill stand pat on what had already been decided in
framing the House version? The answer was apparently
to stand pat, with a cautionary word in the Senate Com-
mittee Report that, in view of the intervention of Hirshon
and Godley, the Committee:
... does not intend any implication from the enactment
of section 312 (a) with respect to the effects of a distribu-
tion of property on earnings and profits and on the
shareholders under the 1939 Code.:6
Since the supposed result under the House Bill was not
written in so many words across the face of the statute
and was based to some extent at least on an erroneous
assumption of what the prior law was, and since the
language of the Bill was not actually changed as a result
of Hirshon and Godley, the question may arise as to
whether the rule does not fall with the assumption.
Superficially this may appear to be a tenable position,
but on closer inspection it is believed that the argument
must fail. First and foremost is the inference to be drawn
from the spelling-out of the rule as to inventories: since
it is specified that unrealized appreciation is to be added
to earnings and profits in the case of distributions of
inventories, the statute must be interpreted to mean that
unrealized appreciation is not to be added to earnings and
profits in other cases. This argument is further supported
by the observation that the charge-off rule in non-inven-
tory cases does not contemplate such an addition, for the
16 SE:N. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 248 (1954).
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reduction in earnings and profits by reason of the distribu-
tion in such cases is limited to the basis of the property
distributed. If in answer to this argument it is contended
that, though the inclusion-in-earnings approach may be
precluded, the basis technique of the Hirshon and Godley
cases is not ruled out, the further point can be made that,
intentionally or unintentionally, the quantitative definition
in terms of fair market value, which formerly applied to
the dividend after its character as such had been inde-
pendently determined, has now been shifted to the distri-
bution itself. Section 301 provides in part as follows:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as otherwise provided in this
chapter, a distribution of property (as defined in section
317 (a) ) made by a corporation to a shareholder with
respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner pro-
vided in subsection (c).
(b) AMOUNT DISTRIBUTED.-
(1) GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of this section, the
amount of any distribution shall be-
(A) NONCORPORATE DIsTmIBUTEEs.-If the shareholder
is not a corporation, the amount of money received,
plus the fair market value of the other property received.
(c) AMOUNT TAxABLE.-In the case of a distribution
to which subsection (a) applies-
(1) AMOUNT CONSTITUTING DIVIDEND.-That portion
of the distribution which is a dividend (as defined in
section 316) shall be included in gross income.17
Section 316 (a), in turn, provides in part as follows:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "dividend"
means any distribution of property made by a corporation
to its shareholders--'18
out of its earnings and profits. Perhaps the inclusion of
the phrase "for purposes of this section" in Section 301
(b) (1), coupled with the rule of Section 312 (a) that
the earnings and profits are to be reduced only by the
basis of the distributed property, prevents this definitional
'7 68A STAT. 84-5 (1954).
I8 68A STAT. 98 (1954).
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argument from being entirely conclusive, but the Govern-
ment's case is certainly weaker for a dual test than under
the 1939 Code. Of even greater importance than the argu-
ment based on change of definition, however, is the fact
that Section 312 (b), which lays down the inventory rule,
makes no sense except against the background of a general
assumption that in determining dividend status the fair
market value, rather than merely basis, of distributed
property must be measured against earnings and profits.
The purpose of adding appreciation to earnings and profits
is to make sure that in inventory cases there will be enough
earnings and profits to take care of appreciation, under a
system of looking at full fair market value at the distribu-
tion as well as the receiving level. Section 312 (b) varies
the result, not the system, in a special class of cases.
Utterly absurd consequences would flow from assuming the
system under which Section 312 (b) is to operate to be that
laid down in Hirshon and Godley. Finally, the endorsement
in the Senate Report of the House Report examples, which
spelled out the fair-market-value rule, is unambiguous evi-
dence of the Congressional intent. It is obvious that the rule
which, in the House Bill, was viewed as merely a clarifica-
tion of existing law, is intended to be continued even
though it may ultimately be shown to constitute a change
in existing law. As a technical matter, this may be said to
involve a determination of what the House rule was, in
the process of which Hirshon and Godley would not be
irrelevant, but this would be a species of renvoi reasoning
in conflict with the realities of the whole record.
Whether this is what the law ought to be is another
question. Earnings and profits equal to the full fair market
valie of the asset distributed are apparently necessary in
order for the distribution to be "out of earnings and
profits" and therefore a dividend. After the distribution,
however, only so much of the earnings and profits as
[Vol. XXX
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equals basis is regarded as having been distributed. Why
should the extra earnings and profits be required in the
first place? They are no more than a magic word the utter-
ance or non-utterance of which ought scarcely to have
tax consequences. Despite the logical nicety of the basis
approach, on the other hand, it too has its unrealities.
The fact is that property worth much more than its
basis in the corporation's hands is being distributed; yet,
the appreciation is a neutral factor in determining the
result and everything turns on how basis compares with
earnings and profits. If we wish dividend consequences,
the approach which adds appreciation to earnings and
profits, as is done in the case of inventories, appears to be
the more appropriate. Arguably, it should be enough that
the corporation escapes tax, without adding to it by giving
the shareholders different treatment from that which
would result if the corporation had realized its gain and
distributed the proceeds. Only the inventory approach
will accomplish this, not the technique of making the
nature of the distribution to the shareholders turn on the
accidental factor of the amount of earnings and profits
computed without reference to the appreciation, - acci-
dental because, by our charge-off rule, we admit it really
has nothing to do with the case. At the same time,
practical considerations may be worth more than logic
in this field. In theory a case could perhaps be made for
foregoing dividend consequences in all cases of unrealized
appreciation not involving stock in trade, as a kind of ex-
tension of the so-called anti-Court-Holding-Company rule'9
to the field of distributions, but there are few who would be
willing to go this far and the lines which have been, or
which were intended to be, drawn in the new Code2 ° may
19 Section 337, designed to overrule Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
20 See, also, the special rule on distributions of proceeds of loans insured
by the United States, contained in Section 312 (j).
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be a fair compromise.2 '
While the questions thus far discussed are intellectually
of great interest, the major problems in the field of
corporate distributions are those dealing with the efforts
of shareholders to realize what is essentially dividend
income in the form of capital gains. Much human ingenuity
has been spent in this direction with, from the standpoint
of the Internal Revenue Service, all too frequent success.
Taxpayers have also complained that, under the amorphous
rules of the law prior to the 1954 Code, excessive zeal
on the part of the Government caused some transactions
which were genuine capital transactions to be treated as
the equivalent of dividend distributions. Therefore,
both sides sought clarification. In addition, it was admitted
that a recent decision had put taxpayers so far ahead in
the preferred-stock bail-out game that legislation was
needed to keep it from becoming a rout.
The broad distinction between the sale of stock, on
the one hand, and the receipt of dividends on such stock,
on the other, is clear enough in the simple case. Even
when liquidating or redemption cases are included in the
sale category our sense of logic is not disturbed. But
suppose a corporation, instead of paying a cash dividend,
distributes a non-taxable stock dividend in the form, say,
of preferred stock, which it thereafter promptly "pur-
chases", i.e., redeems, from its shareholders. Obviously
capital gains treatment ought not to be available in such a
case, and it was ruled out as far back as 1921,22 but only,
be it noted, where the issuance and the redemption were
part of a plan the effect of which was to make the redemp-
tion the equivalent of a dividend. Suppose, then, that the
21 Since the preparation of this analysis, the Treasury has released pro-
posed regulations under subchapter C, section 1.316-1(a) (3) of which takes
the position that Hirshon and Godley continue to be the law under the 1954
Code.
22 Section 201 (d), Revenue Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 228-9 (1921).
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transaction is reversed, and stock is first redeemed and
then replaced by the issuance of a non-taxable stock
dividend. Again the answer is obvious, but it took another
revenue act to reach it.23 Finally it became clear that a
redemption of stock might well be the equivalent of a
dividend even though entirely unconnected with a stock
dividend. Suppose A owns all the stock of the X Corpora-
tion, which he organized for $100,000 in cash. The X
Corporation has prospered and now has $50,000 of earn-
ings and profits, which it desires to distribute to A. In an
effort to avoid exposing A to tax on a dividend of $50,000,
it "buys" one-third of his stock for $50,000. This in no way
affects A's ownership or control of the corporation, for he
will still hold 100 percent of its stock. Should he be per-
mitted to say that, instead of a $50,000 dividend, all he
has received is a $16,667 capital gain? Every income tax
law since the Revenue Act of 192624 has said no, but in
very general terms, as follows (Section 115 (g) (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939):
(g) Redemption of stock.
(1) In general. If a corporation cancels or redeems its
stock (whether or not such stock was issued as a stock
dividend) at such time and in such manner as to make
the distribution, and cancellation or redemption in whole
or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a
taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemp-
tion or cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it
represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumu-
lated after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a tax-
able dividend. 25
Every case is not so simple as that between A and his
corporafion. At the opposite extreme is the case where A
is merely one of many unrelated shareholders who has
23 Section 201 (f), Revenue Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 255 (1924).
24 Section 201 (g), Revenue Act of 1926, 44 STAT 11 (1926).
25 INT. REv. CODE of 1939 § 115 (g) (1). Paragraphs (2) and (3) deal with
redemptions through use of subsidiary corporation and redemptions to pay
death taxes, respectively, covered in the 1954 Code by Sections 303 and 304.
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all his stock redeemed and thereafter has no interest in
the corporation. Clearly the redemption of his stock is not
the equivalent of a dividend. It is the cases in between
that have presented the problem.
As a result of one Supreme Court decision involving a
related problem under the reorganization provisions,2" it
was once suggested that Section 115 (g) was applicable in
any case to the extent of the corporation's earnings and
profits. But this certainly could not be, or Congress would
have said so instead of employing the language it did.
Moreover, such an approach would catch the complete
buy-out case, which everyone agrees is a sale and nothing
but a sale. The true test is whether the shareholder's
proprietary interest in the corporation as a result of the
redemption has been substantially altered. If it has, then
the shareholder has parted with something and sale treat-
ment is indicated. If it has not, then what the shareholder
has received is in the nature of a dividend. The existence
of earnings and profits is, of course, a further requirement
in order for a dividend tax to arise. And it should be
observed that under Section 115 (g)" the dual test of
source, i.e., earnings and profits of the taxable year or
accumulated earnings and profits, is not used; only accu-
mulated earnings and profits are of significance.'
The foregoing leaves out of account the concept of
corporate liquidation and the bearing which, rightly or
wrongly, it may have on the treatment of stock redemp-
tions. Section 115 (c) of prior law provided in part as
follows:
•... amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a
26 Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
27 INT. R V. CODE Of 1939.
28 Vesper Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1942), is to the con-
trary, but this involved a special situation under the undistributed profits tax.
The Internal Revenue Service has in general either regarded the phrase
"earnings of profits accumulated after February 28, 1913" as controlling or
determined that dividend equivalence did not exist where there were no
accumulated earnings and profits.
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corporation shall be treated as in part or full payment
in exchange for the stock.
29
It is not an unnatural feeling that a distribution which
represents a liquidation of the corporate business is not
a dividend equivalent. The shareholder gives the appear-
ance of cashing in on a part of his investment when the
business itself is being contracted. And so, somewhat
haltingly, the cases have gone. But there is a strong body
of opinion which rejects the relevance of the partial
liquidation approach, on the ground that the effect upon
the shareholder is the only thing that counts when the
problem is how the shareholder should be taxed. If the
shareholder is still in the same relative proprietary position
as before and the amount distributed is not in excess of
the corporation's earnings and profits, the fact that such
earnings and profits have previously been invested in the
business and that their withdrawal from the business and
distribution to the shareholders works a reduction in the
size or scope of the corporation's activities as they were
constituted immediately prior to the distribution should
not alter the fact that the shareholder has received a
distribution of profits and has not liquidated a part of his
investment. It is further argued that the irrelevancy
of looking at the effect upon the corporation persists
whether the partial liquidation of its business is voluntary
or involuntary, whether what is being wound up is a
separate business as compared with the continuing activi-
ties of the company, whether it was acquired or de-
veloped out of accumulated earnings or constituted part
of the corporation's original business, and regardless of the
fact that two corporations might have been formed to start
with, in which case the winding up of either would have
been a complete liquidation taxable at capital gain rates.30
29 IwT. REV. CODE of 1939 § 115 (c).
30 Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau and Warren, A Technical Revision of the Fed-
eral Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52
COL. L. REV. 1 (1952).
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Both approaches are preserved in the 1954 revision,
though they are now separately stated as opposed to being
merged and indistinct as under prior law. In the House
Bill an effort was made to get away from the exercise of
judgment involved in any general test of equivalence or
non-equivalence to a dividend and to substitute purely
mechanical tests in both areas. Thus, looked at from the
shareholders' point of view, stock redemptions were
treated as sale transactions rather than distributions only
if they completely terminated the particular shareholder's
interest in the corporation, or if they were substantially
disproportionate in the sense of reducing the shareholder's
percentage of ownership of participating stock by more
than 20 percent, or if the shareholder owned less than
one percent of the corporation's participating stock, or,
under .limitations, if the redemption was to pay death
taxes. Rules of constructive ownership were also pro-
vided to prevent manipulation within family groups, or
through the use of trusts, partnerships, corporate holding
companies, etc. The partial liquidation approach was
handled by an exclusive definition of the term as meaning
a distribution by a corporation in redemption of a part of
its stock pursuant to a plan, provided that the distribution
occurred within the taxable year of adoption of the plan
or the following taxable year and was attributable to the
complete termination of one of at least two operating
businesses, separately conducted and bookkept for at
least five years and no more than 10 percent of the in-
come of which in any year of such five-year period was
personal holding company income.
Immediate dissatisfaction was expressed with the "clari-
fication" thus proposed, mainly because it made clearly
taxable as dividends many redemptions which it was felt
ought not to be so treated. All preferred stock redemptions
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would be so treated, for example, to the extent such stock
was held by persons owning one percent or more, of the
corporation's common stock, unless accompanied by a
disproportionate redemption of the common stock in their
hands or the redemption qualified as a distribution in
partial liquidation. The rules of constructive ownership
made such a blanket approach all the more questionable
and also increased the indigestibility of making mathe-
matically determined disproportionateness the sole test of
non-equivalence to a dividend. On the partial liquidation
side, great concern was felt over the extreme narrowness
of the definition. While the presence or absence of separate
books and records might be evidentiary, it ought not to be
conclusive. The personal holding company income test was
regarded as unrealistic at the percentage levels set forth
in the Bill. Finally, it was argued that cases involving con-
traction of a single business ought also to be covered.
Basically the Senate revision, which became the final
version, converted what were exclusive definitions under
the House Bill into rules which, if complied with, would
establish non-dividend treatment without further argu-
ment and added a judgment area of equivalence or non-
equivalence to a dividend. The bifurcation set forth in
the House Bill was preserved, with the equivalence or non-
equivalence test appearing in both branches, though it
was intended to have a different meaning in each of its two
contexts. At the same time there was some revision in
detail of the mechanical rules themselves.
Section 302, which deals with distributions in redemp-
tion of stock, tested from the shareholder's point of view,
begins by according sale treatment to any redemption
which is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. So far
as it goes, this appears to leave the law where it was under
old Section 115 (g),31 except for the gloss added by the
31 INT. REV. CODE of 1939.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Senate Finance Committee Report that equivalence or
non-equivalence to a dividend is to be determined with-
out reference to earnings and profits.2 The question is
"whether or not the transaction by its nature may prop-
erly be characterized as a sale of stock by the redeeming
shareholder to the cprporation." The principal result of a
determination that redemption is the equivalent of a
dividend despite the absence of earnings and profits (pre-
sumably on the ground that it is pro rata) is to treat the
redemption price as a distribution applicable against the
shareholder's entire investment rather than only against
his investment in the shares of stock redeemed. While this
forms a logical pattern, it seems an unnecessary refine-
ment. Dividend equivalence is a troublesome enough ques-
tion without enlarging the area of its application to cases
where no earnings and profits are present. The taxpayer,
having made his bed in such cases, might justifiably be
made to lie in it-unless, of course, the whole thing is a
subtle way of putting the question of dividend equiva-
lence in its proper setting and avoiding extreme conten-
tions such as are suggested in the Bedford case.33 In any
event, it will be a novelty to find taxpayers contending for
dividend equivalence. With double the ingenuity formerly
employed now brought to bear on both sides of the con-
troversy, the subject of dividend equivalence may hence-
forth be exhaustively developed as never before.
From this point on, Section 302 goes into particulars.
Three specific tests are laid down, compliance with any of
which will avoid distribution treatment."4 One of these,
which excludes from the dividend category any redemp-
32- Of course, a distribution which is equivalent to a dividend is so taxed
only to the extent of earnings and profits, but in the new Code current as well
as accumulated earnings and profits are taken into account.
33 See Note 26, supra.
34 Section 303 adds a fourth: Redemptions to pay death taxes. The sub-
ject would also not be complete without reference to Section 304, dealing with
redemptions through the use of related corporations.
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tion of stock of a railroad corporation issued in a bank-
ruptcy reorganization, is purely arbitrary. The other two
are in a sense merely definitions of what is meant by non-
equivalence to a dividend, though it is specifically pro-
vided that nd inferences are to be drawn from failure to
meet their terms; that is to say, if the taxpayer qualifies
under the specific tests, he is in the clear, but, if he fails
so to qualify, he can fall back on the general rule unem-
barrassed by such failure. The first of these two rules pro-
vides for sale rather than dividend treatment in the case
of a particular shareholder if the redemption is, as to him,
substantially disproportionate, the second if his share-
holder interest is entirely terminated. While the latter may
appear to be merely an extreme example of the former,
they are separately stated since there is a difference be-
tween them in the application of the rules as to construc-
tive ownership.
The mathematical formula for determining whether a
distribution is substantially disproportionate is, as al-
ready suggested, slightly different from that found in the
House Bill. To qualify, the taxpayer must after the re-
demption own less than 50 percent of the combined vot-
ing power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and must
have had his percentage of ownership both of voting stock
and of common stock reduced by more than 20 percent.
It is to be observed that it is the taxpayer's percentage of
ownership, not the amount of stock he owns, which must
be reduced by 20 percent. Thus, if there is only one class
of stock outstanding, consisting of 100 shares, of which
the taxpayer owns 55, and his is the only stock redeemed,
his 55 percent ownership must be reduced to less than 44
percent to qualify. Since the total number of shares out-
standing will also be decreased, this means that much more
than 11 shares will have to be redeemed. The minimum
would have to be 20 shares, leaving him only 35, or 43
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plus percent of the 80 shares which would then be out-
standing. There is, of course, a policing provision to catch
cases where the redemption, though appearing by itself
to qualify, is made (Section 302(b) (2) (D)):
... pursuant to a plan the purpose or effect of which
is a series of redemptions resulting in a distribution
which (in the aggregate) is not substantially dispropor-
tionate with respect to the shareholder.35
Provisions like this, while obviously necessary, constitute
the wear and tear of the practice of tax law, for there will
always be taxpayers who will wish to walk right up to
the line without crossing it and who will expect to be
advised unequivocally exactly where it is. To revert to
the percentage rule itself, questions of valuation may
also arise where there is more than one class of common
stock, since the 20 percent rule is there applied on a fair
market value basis. It goes without saying that there can
never be a disproportionate redemption of the stock of a
100 percent. shareholder.
On the subject of termination of a shareholder's interest,
Section 302 (b) (3) states simply that sales treatment shall
apply:
i.. fi the redemption is in complete redemption of all
the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.3 6
The complications are found in the limitations on the rules
dealing with constructive ownership as applied to ter-
mination cases.
Section 318 lays down rules of constructive stock own-
ership which are applicable in a variety of situations, in-
cluding redemption cases. They cover a page and a half
of the statute. Briefly, a person is deemed to own stock
owned by his parents, spouse, children, and grandchildren.
35 68A STAT. 86 (1954).
36 Ibid.
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This is known as the family rule. In addition, stock owned
by a partnership, trust, or estate is deemed to be owned
proportionately by its members or beneficiaries. If any
person owns 50 percent of the stock (by value) of a cor-
poration, any stock owned by that corporation is also at-
tributed to him on a proportionate basis. These partner-
ship, trust, estate, and corporation cases also work in
reverse, that is, stock owned by any person to whom stock
owned by the entity may be attributed, is deemed owned
by the entity, with certain limitations in trust cases to
eliminate remote contingent interests. Finally, a person
is deemed to own any stock he may have an option to
acquire.
These rules are relaxed in only one type of redemption
case, viz., where all the stock of the shareholder is re-
deemed. In such cases the family rule (but only the family
rule) is inoperative, if immediately after the redemption
the redeeming shareholder has no interest in the cor-
poration (including an interest as an officer, director, or
employee) other than as a creditor, he does not acquire
any such interest (other than stock acquired by bequest or.
inheritance) within a period of ten years, and he enters
into an agreement with the Secretary or his delegate as
to notification and record keeping. Disqualification result-
ing from a proscribed acquisition within the ten-year pe-
riod works a reopening of the redemption or any other
affected year for purposes of collecting the resulting de-
ficiency. Even the limited relaxation of the family rule is
inapplicable when any portion of the stock redeemed
was acquired within ten years prior to the redemption
from a person whose ownership on the redemption date
would be attributable to the taxpayer under any of the
constructive ownership rules or the taxpayer transferred
stock during such period to any person who owns stock on
the redemption date attributable to the taxpayer and the
stock so transferred is redeemed in the same transaction,
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unless the acquisition in the one case and the transfer
in the other can be shown not to have had as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax.
Much of the effect on the redemption problem of this
elaborate pattern of attributed ownership remains to be
disclosed by experience. Its narrowing effect on the ap-
plication of the mechanical formula for determining dis-
proportionateness is, of course, obvious. If father and son
each own 50 percent of the stock of the X Corporation,
for example, there is no way of qualifying. under the me-
chanical formula, for each will be considered as owning
100 percent, and no redemption of the stock of either can
reduce him below that percentage. The only course of
action in such a case is for one or the other to sever all
connection with the corporation. The effect on the more
general test of non-equivalence to a dividend is more
difficult to measure, as is, indeed, the scope of that test
in any of its aspects.
Presumably the main area of operation of the general
non-equivalence test lies in the redemption of preferred
stock. The basic concept being whether the redemption is
pro rata or non pro rata relative to underlying equity
interests, some general standards, perhaps varying from
case to case depending on intangible considerations dif-
ficult to enumerate, will doubtless be applied. If the cor-
poration is publicly held, a much greater tolerance may
be permitted than in the case of a closely held corpora-
tion. It is possible also that control may be a material factor.
To take the extremes, it seems clear that if all the stock of
the corporation is owned by a single shareholder, the fact
that some of it may be preferred and it is the preferred
that is redeemed will not prevent the redemption from
being treated as a dividend, whereas, if a shareholder own-
ing only two percent of the equity stock also happens to
own two percent of the preferred and only the preferred
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owned by him is redeemed, the redemption would not be
the equivalent of a dividend. Moreover, in the former case,
if the equity stock was all owned equally by father and
son, but the preferred by only one of them, the redemp-
tion of the preferred would still be a dividend, because of
the rules of constructive ownership. An interesting ques-
tion is whether the pro rata nature of the redemption
,of preferred stock will be determined on a shareholder-
by-shareholder or on an over-all basis. Also to what extent
can the general non-equivalence test save a common
stock redemption that does not qualify under the me-
chanical test of disproportionateness? Will a less than 20
percent reduction in percentage of ownership qualify if
the shareholder loses control by reason of the redemption?
If so, a shareholder would be better off to have had con-
trol beforehand than never to have had it at all. Yet,
such a shareholder would be parting with an important
attribute of ownership as compared with one who was
a minority shareholder both before and after the redemp-
tion. Perhaps all that can be said at this time is that, with
the partial liquidation rules which are about to be dis-
cussed available to rescue the non-disproportionate com-
mon stock redemption in proper cases and with the ap-
parent purpose for restoring the general non-equivalence
test being to cover preferred stock redemptions which
would have been unjustifiably caught under the House Bill,
any common stock redemption not covered by the mechani-
cal rules of Section 302 should be approached with caution.
If the distribution whereby the stock is redeemed is a
distribution in partial liquidation, sales treatment is ac-
corded even though it is completely pro rata. But there
is a deceptive similarity in phraseology insofar as basic
concepts are concerned to that found in Section 302. In
Section 346, which defines the term "partial liquidation,"
as well as in Section 302, the fundamental approach is
that of non-equivalence to a dividend. But, though the
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words are the same, the meaning is not. In the one case
dividend equivalence turns on whether the redemption
distribution is substantially pro rata (or, perhaps, if the
loss-of-control point already mentioned has any validity,
it would be more accurate to say that the distribution
must not alter the distributee's proprietary relationship
to the corporation materially); in the other' it turns on
whether there has been a distribution of earnings and
-profits as such or a pro tanto winding up of the corpora-
tion's business.
The definition of partial liquidation is principally an
attempt to approach the dividend question from the point
of view of the distributing corporation. If the corporation,
in the process of closing out a part of its business, makes
distributions to its shareholders in redemption of a portion
of their stock, the shareholders are regarded as disposing
of a part of their investment as opposed to merely draw-
ing down income. Owing to a reluctance to employ the
term "contraction of the business" in the statute, how-
ever, the seeds of some confusion may perhaps have been
sown. The statutory test is that the distribution must be
not essentially equivalent to a dividend, must be in re-
demption of part of the corporation's stock pursuant to a
plan, and must occur within the taxable year within which
the plan is adopted or the next taxable year. The aids to
construction are the Senate Committee Report,3" which
underscores the corporate approach to the test of dividend
non-equivalence and states that what is meant is cases
of contraction of the corporate business, and the specific
rule of Section 346 (b) dealing with the termination of
one of several businesses.
Under Section 346 (b) a distribution shall be treated
as a distribution under Section 346 (a) (2), that is to
say, a distribution in partial liquidation, if it is attributable
37 SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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to the corporation's ceasing to conduct a trade or business
and consists of the assets of such trade or business, or the
proceeds from their disposition, or both; if such trade or
business had been actively conducted for the five preceding
years either by the distributing corporation, or by a person
from whom or which it was acquired in a completely tax-
free transaction, or both; and if another trade or business
meeting the same tests as to active conduct is retained by
the distributing corporation. On the surface these rules
are clear and precise, but in many cases it may be
difficult to identify separate trades or businesses and the
period for which each has been conducted. To guard
against an overtechnical approach the Conference Re-
port states that:
... a trade or business which has been actively con-
ducted throughout the 5-year period described in such
sections [355 and 346] will meet the requirements of
such sections, even though such trade or business under-
went change during such 5-year period, for example, by
the addition of new, or the dropping of old, products,
changes in production capacity, and the like, provided
the changes are not of such a character as to constitute
the acquisition of a new or different business.38
The reason for the five-year rule being to prevent conver-
sion of cash surplus into a trade or business for the pur-
pose of distribution at capital gain rates, it is hoped that
these questions of degree will be decided with an eye to
the general atmosphere of the particular case. 9
One more aspect of the problem of ordinary dividends
versus capital gains remains to be discussed, viz., stock
38 H. R. RP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1954).
39 Since the preparation of this analysis, proposed regulations under sub-
chapter C have been released, pointing toward a narrower concept of "trade
or business" than was anticipated. This is of greater importance in connec-
tion with certain reorganization distributions than in connection with partial
liquidations, because of the presence in Section 346 of the contraction-of-a-
single-business rule as well as that involving liquidation of one of several
businesses. Discussion will therefore be reserved until the reorganization
sections are reached. See Note 43, infra.
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dividends. We have already seen that the treatment of cer-
tain redemptions as dividend equivalents originated as
an attempt to prevent the conversion of ordinary dividends
into capital gains by the issuance of non-taxable stock
dividends followed by their almost immediate redemption.
The redemption problem was soon seen to be far broader
than the redemption of stock dividends, however, and the
applicable provision was thereupon made to cover redemp-
tion of any stock, no matter how issued, finally reaching
the state of development which has just been described.
At the same time it has gradually become clear that the
stock dividend problem extends beyond the redemption
area. The acute nature of the problem was pointed up for
all to see with the decision, late in 1953, by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Chamberlin v. Commis-
sioner. ° That case involved a large non-taxable stock
dividend of preferred on common, which the share-
holders had already arranged to sell to an insurance com-
pany from which the issuing company was committed to
redeem it over a relatively short period of time. Upon
sale to the insurance company the shareholders claimed
capital gains treatment, stoutly resisting the suggestion
of the Commissioner that the whole scheme was merely a
device for taking down a cash dividend, with the insurance
company acting as a go-between. And the shareholders
won.
This decision was regarded as something of a bolt from
the blue. Until only the last few years, however, it was
not impossible to obtain a ruling and closing agreement
from the Treasury on precisely such a transaction. It is
difficult to believe that this was owing to lack of sophis-
tication; it must have been from the cofiviction that it was
an inevitable consequence of the non-taxability of stock
dividends and that the situation, if it was to be remedied
40 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954).
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at all, would have to be approached directly, i.e., by re-
stricting, to common on common, if possible, the types of
stock dividends that could be distributed tax-free. But,
whatever the reason, by the time of the 1954 Code, the
Treasury was alerted to the demoralizing possibilities
of the Chamberlin situation. The necessity for doing some-
thing about it was all the more pressing, since the new
Code was about to extend rather than narrow the area of
tax-free stock dividends. In fact, all stock dividends have
now been made tax-free by Section 305 of the new Code,
except those where the shareholder has the option to take
money or other property and those issued in payment of
preference dividends for the current or first preceding
year.
Apparently on the mistaken belief that it would be
inappropriate to impose dividend consequences until
money or property was actually paid out by the corpora-
tion itself, and perhaps also for ease of administration,
the House Bill continued to permit preferred stock re-
ceived as a non-taxable stock dividend to be sold (as
distinguished from redeemed) with the usual privilege
of offsetting basis and taxing only the sales profit, almost
invariably at capital gains rates. It was provided, however,
that, if such stock was redeemed within ten years of its
issuance, under circumstances which did not justify treat-
ing the redemption as the equivalent of a dividend, except
where Section 303, dealing with redemptions to pay death
taxes, was applicable, a transfer tax of 85 percent of the
amount distributed was to be laid on the distributing cor-
poration.4 The hue and cry against this provision was
instantaneous. Since it covered old issues as well as new,
stock issued for property and stock issued in reorganiza-
tions as well as stock issued in the form of non-taxable
41 This transfer tax also applied to redemption of "non-participating'
stock issued for property, if and to the extent it was redeemed for more
than 105 percent of the amount received on issuance.
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stock dividends, and since, because of the rules of con-
structive ownership, corporations could not rely on their
own records to determine whether they or their share-
holders would bear the tax on redemption, and since the
ten-year period began afresh on January 1, 1954, in case
of previously issued stock, it was alleged that the pro-
posed rule would produce unprecedented hardship and
confusion. Even more basic objections were that it reached
the wrong person and that it validated rather than repudi-
ated Chamberlin, requiring only that the insurance com-
pany retain its investment for ten years. Half-hearted at-
tempts to rebut these objections were made, as, for ex-
ample, by arguing that bail-out cases were usually con-
fined to closely-held corporations where there was an
identity of interest between the benefiting shareholders
and the. corporation and that a ten-year waiting period,
with all the restrictions an insurance company would im-
pose, would make the device relatively unattractive (of
course, the bailers-out could wait nine years to sell), but
these attempts were unconvincing.
The Code as finally enacted adopted the direct approach
of going after the original shareholder upon the redemp-
tion or first sale of the dividend stock. The operative pro-
vision is Section 306 and the type of stock with which it
deals, known as Section 306 stock, is defined therein.
Section 306 stock consists primarily of preferred stock
issued as a non-taxable stock dividend on common stock,
but it also includes any kind of stock, common or preferred,
issued as a non-taxable stock dividend on preferred
stock. From this basic concept, the definition moves on to
cover preferred stock received in a reorganization or cor-
porate separation tax-free, if the effect of the transaction
is substantially the same as the receipt of a stock dividend
or the stock is received in exchange for Section 306 stock.
Presimnably the test of whether the transaction is the
equivalent of a stock dividend is whether an equivalent
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cash distribution would have been a dividend at the time
the preferred stock was received. Note, however, that in
this area common stock can be received in satisfaction of
preference dividend rights without being designated Sec-
tion 306 stock. Finally, if in any other type of transaction
the taxpayer has acquired stock the basis of which in
his hands is determined with reference to the basis of
Section 306 stock, such stock is or continues to be Section
306 stock. This last will cover gift stock which in the hands
of the donor was Section 306 stock, stock of a holding
company organized to hold Section 306 stock, and Section
306 stock received from a subsidiary in an intercorporate
liquidation with a carryover basis.
Supplementary provisions to cover deviations from the
norm are next spelled out. Stock rights are to be treated as
stock and stock acquired through the exercise of stock
rights is treated as distributed at the time of the distribu-
tion of the rights to the extent of the fair market value
of the rights at such time. Common stock convertible into
any other kind of stock or into property is not treated as
common stock. Moreover, when the terms and conditions
of stock are changed, the date of such change is intro-
duced as an additional point of reference, if it operates
to the taxpayer's disadvantage. On the other hand, if
Section 306 stock which was issued with respect to com-
mon stock is converted back into common stock of the
same corporation, the curse of Section 306 is lifted. And
an over-all limitation on the operation of the section
is provided in the form of excluding from the definition
of Section 306 stock any stock no part of the distribution
of which would have been a dividend at the time of the
distribution if money had been distributed in lieu of such
stock.
Now for the tax consequences of the sale or redemption
of Section 306 stock. If the cash realization takes the form
of a redemption, the entire amount of the redemption price
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is treated as an ordinary distribution taxable as a dividend
to the extent of available earnings and profits, unless the
distribution is a liquidating distribution or unless it is
within Section 302 (b) (3) already discussed, dealing with
complete termination of the shareholder's interest in the
corporation. If it takes the form of sale or exchange, so
much of the sales price will be taxed as gain from the
sale of a non-capital asset as does not exceed the amount
that would have been a dividend had money equal to
the stock's fair market value been distributed in lieu of
the Section 306 stock. The only exception is where the
shareholder parts with his entire stock interest, subject
to the constructive ownership rules of Section 318(a).
In both situations, the general non-recognition provisions
of the Code are allowed to operate, so that, to the extent
that under such provisions gain or loss to the shareholder
is not recognized with respect to the disposition of the
Section 306 stock, the taxing provision (though not nec-
essarily the definitional provisions) of Section 306 are in-
operative. Section 306 is similarly made inapplicable under
the circumstances described in subsection (b) (4):
(4) TRANS&CTIONS NOT IN AvoIDANCE.-If it is estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his dele-
gate -
(A) that the distribution, and the disposition or
redemption, or
(B) in the case of a prior or simultaneous dispo-
sition (or redemption) of the stock with respect to
which the section 306 stock disposed of (or re-
deemed) was issued, that the disposition (or redemp-
tion) of the section 306 stock,
was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax.42
Some differences between use of the sales route and
use of the redemption route for ultimate cash realization
in the case of Section 306 stock should be noted. In the
42 68A STAT. 91 (1954).
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first place, in the case of a sale, the ordinary income con-
sequences are measured by the corporation's earnings and
profits at the time of distribution; in the case of redemp-
tion, at the time of redemption. In the second place, in
the case of a sale, the ordinary income consequences are
produced by treating the amount realized "as gain from
the sale of property which is not a capital asset"; in the
case of redemption, the amount realized is a dividend.
The dividend exclusion, the dividend received credit, and,
when the shareholder is a corporation, the dividend re-
ceived deduction apply only where there is a redemption
and not where there is a sale. The same differences exist
in the case of the foreign tax credit. Also, in termination
cases the family rule continues to be fully applicable
where a sale, as opposed to a redemption, takes place.
Finally, the amount not taxed as ordinary income is ap-
plied against only the basis of the Section 306 stock for
purposes of computing any further capital gain in sale
cases (no loss is ever allowed), but apparently against
the basis of all the stock (or at least the stock with respect
to which the Section 306 stock was issued) owned by the
shareholder in redemption cases. These differences are
pointed out, not in criticism, but in warning.
So much for the bail-out problem. Section 306 gives
the appearance of being extremely complicated, and,
viewed in detail, it is. Nevertheless, with the broad out-
lines of its policy fixed firmly in mind, the pattern is not
too difficult to follow. Lack of omniscience on the part of
the framers of the language may have laid unintended
traps or left loopholes, but a wise exercise of the Secre-
tary's discretion as to non-avoidance cases should restrict
the area of hardship and, as to loopholes, at least it can
be said that attempted tax avoidance in the bail-out field
has been made extremely hazardous and those opportuni-
ties that may have been inadvertently overlooked can be
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barred by future legislation as they may come to light.3
C. Rudolf Peterson*
43 The second part of Mr. Peterson's article on Subchapter C of the IN-
TERNAL REvENuE CODE of 1954 is scheduled to appear in the May, 1955 issue of
the Lawyer.
* Practicing attorney; partner in the firm of Lee, Toomey & Kent, Wash-
ington, D.C.
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